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ABSTRACT: 
The Kyoto Protocol mandates that the US reduce emissions of greenhouse gases to 93% of their 
1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. This paper looks at the possibility of reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions in the transportation sector to 7% below their 1990 level by 2010. To achieve 
these reductions, we examine two policies: CAFE standards and gasoline taxes. The introduction 
of these policies individually makes the task seem daunting, yet when using the policies jointly, 
-
Kyoto Protocol objectives are achievable. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Kyoto Protocol requires the US to reduce the rate of emissions ofgreenhouse gases 
to 93% of their 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. The Protocol includes six greenhouse 
gases, but of these, carbon dioxide (C02) is the most important. In 1995, energy consumption in 
the US was 91 quadrillion Btu per year. Transportation accounted for 27% of energy 
consumption (EIA, 1997a, p 101-2) and 35% of CO2 emissions in 1995 (Davis, 1997, p 7-2). Of 
the energy used in the transportation sector, light-duty vehicles (passenger cars and light trucks) 
accounted for 59% of the total energy consumed (EIA, 1997a, pIll). Assuming that each sector 
will be analyzed with respect to the potential to meet the proportional reductions sanctioned by 
the Kyoto Protocol, we analyze policies that will allow light-duty vehicles to reduce CO2 
emissions to 93% of 1990 levels by 2010. 
This paper develops a model that forecasts future energy demand and CO2 emissions in 
the light-duty vehicle sector to 2010. From a base case scenario, we introduce policies which lead 
gasoline consumption and CO2 emissions to meet Protocol objectives. We evaluate two policies: 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and gasoline taxes. The introduction of 
these policies individually makes the task seem daunting, yet when combining policies, Kyoto 
Protocol objectives are achievable. 
TRANSPORTATION POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS 
CAFE Standard 
The CAFE standard requires automotive manufacturers to meet sales weighted minimum 
-

fuel efficiency standards for each model year on light-duty vehicles sold in the US. The standard 
for passenger cars was introduced in 1978 with a sales weighted fuel efficiency minimum of 18 
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mpg. In that same year, domestic manufacturers produced new cars with an average fuel 
efficiency of 18.7 mpg. Imported cars were a more impressive 27.3 mpg. The standard slowly 
increased over the next 10 years, reaching 27.5 mpg in 1990 (it had previously reached 27.5 mpg 
in 1985, but was reduced to 26.0 mpg the following year). The CAFE standard for passenger 
cars has remained at 27.5 mpg to the present (AAMA, 1997, P 80). 
The standard for light trucks was introduced in 1979 at 17.2 mpg for 2-wheel drive 
vehicles and 15.8 for 4-wheel drive vehicles. Two-wheel and 4-wheel drive vehicles were 
combined to one standard in 1992 at 20.2 mpg, and the standard has increased to 20.7 mpg today 
(AAMA, 1997, P 81). When the standard for light trucks commenced in 1979, it only applied to 
light trucks with a gross vehicle weight (GVW) less than 6,000 lbs. In 1980, the standard 
expanded to include all light trucks up to 8,500 lbs GVW. Typically, light trucks refer to Class I 
and II trucks, up to 10,000 lbs, but the heavier trucks are not regulated for fuel efficiency or 
emission standards. Light trucks greater than 8,500 GVW include some of the larger Dodge 
Rams, Ford Econolines, Ford F and CIK series pickups, GMC Sierra pickups, GMC Suburbans, 
and GMC Vanduras (Ward's Communications, 1996, p 245-52). Larger light trucks with GVW 
from 8,500 lbs to 10,000 lbs remain unregulated by CAFE and emission standards. 
Fines for violating CAFE standards are $55/mpg per vehicle sold. l Manufacturers can 
bank and borrow fuel economy surpluses and deficits up to three years. For example, Ford Motor 
Company's sales weighted fuel economy in 1994 for their domestically produced light trucks was 
21 mpg, 0.5 mpg above the average. In the next two years their fuel economy averages exceeded 
the standard by 0.2 mpg and 0.1 mpg. However, in 1997, Ford's sales weighted fuel economy 
1 The fine increased from $5 per 0.1 mpg per vehicle to $5.50 on March 6,1997 (NHTSA, 1998). 
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average dropped to 19.9 mpg, 0.8 mpg below the standard. By carrying forward their surpluses 
from the previous three years, 0.5, 0.2, and 0.1, Ford is still in compliance in 1997. However, if 
they do not meet the standard in 1998, they will be fined $5.50 per 0.1 mpg that they fall short of 
the standard unless they file a carryback plan to demonstrate that they anticipate earning credits in 
future model years to offset current deficits (NHTSA, 1998). With a domestic light truck sales 
fleet of approximately 2 million vehicles, this is a $11 million fine for each 0.1 mpg they fall short 
of20.7 mpg. 
In 1997, the federal government collected $806,465 from manufacturers for passenger car 
violations. Panoz Auto Development Company, Inc. paid $3,850 for violations in their Model 
Year (MY) 1994 cars and $1,395 for MY 1995 violations. Fiat Auto paid fines of$801,220 for 
MY 1995 violations (NHTSA, 1998). 
Gasoline Taxes 
Consumers pay local, state, and federal gasoline taxes at the pump. Federal gasoline taxes 
were 4¢ per gallon from 1960 to 1982 (in current prices). Taxes rose to 9¢ per gallon by 1984, 
and stayed at that level until 1991 when they increased again to 14.1¢ per gallon. In 1994, federal 
taxes increased to 18.4¢ per gallon and remain at that level. State gasoline taxes increased more 
gradually, from an average of6.1¢ per gallon in 1960 to 40.8¢ per gallon in 1997 (API, 1998). In 
1995, state taxes ranged from a low of7.5¢ in Georgia to a high of25.4¢ in Nebraska (AAMA, 
1997). In real tenns, total state and federal taxes steadily decreased until 1982, then gradually 
increased to the present (see Figure 1). In 1997, the total tax component ofgasoline price 
(40.8¢/gallon) was lower in real dollars than in 1960 (55¢/gallon). 
-

To put these gasoline taxes in perspective, Figure 2 presents retail gasoline prices for eight 
OECD countries, separated into the retail price component and the tax component. While the 
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actual pre-tax price ofgasoline shows little variation, ranging from 61 ¢ in Canada to $1.Olin 
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Japan, tax rates are significantly different. Currently, the UK tax is the highest, adding $3.75 to 
each gallon, almost ten times the US rate of38¢ per gallon. 
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Figure 1. US Gasoline Prices and Taxes· 
• Prices include federal and state taxes. 
Source: API, 1998, P 9. 
Gas Guzzler Tax 
Consumers pay a Gas Guzzler Tax on new car purchases if the car's combined citylhighway fuel 
-

economy rating is lower than 22.5 mpg. The tax ranges from $7,700 for cars with a fuel economy 
less than 12.5 mpg to $1,000 for cars with mpgs from 21.5-22.5 mpg (AAMA, 1997, P 82). 
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Figure 2. Gasoline Prices and Taxes, June 1998 
Source: lEA, 1998, P 3. 
ELASTICITY ESTIMATES FROM PREVIOUS WORK 
Several studies have addressed the policy issues arising from CAFE and tax proposals. 
Typically, the mathematical structure includes three main variables: fuel efficiency (MPG), 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT), and fuel consumption (Qr). These variables are linked through the 
identity: Qf =VMTIMPG . 
While these equations take many forms, the final result is typically an estimation ofvarious 
elasticities. The model used in this paper builds on work done by Greene (1992 and 1990a), ­
Wheaton (1982), Mayo and Mathis (1988), Blair, Kaserman, and Tepel (1984), and Nivola and 
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Crandall (1995). All of these papers estimate fuel efficiency and vehicle miles traveled and then 
typically calculate fuel consumption. 
The basic equation for fuel efficiency includes the price ofgasoline, income, and time. 
However, researchers typically include additional variables, especially when testing specific policy 
changes. Table 1 presents the variables used in fuel efficiency models in previous studies. All 
models include the price of gasoline. Most of the studies include a variable for income, measured 
as real GDP, per capita GDP, or disposable income. Gately (1990) and Espey (1996) use a 
dynamic model, including a lag ofMPG on the right hand side. This allows estimates of both 
long- and short-run price and income elasticities for fuel efficiency. Mayo and Mathis (1988) 
added a variable for average highway speed to test the effect of a change in average highway 
speeds on demand for fuel efficiency. 
A variable for CAFE rarely appears in these models. However, where included it takes 
different forms. Nivola and Crandall (1995) use a ratio of the current CAFE standard to the pre-
CAFE value of new car fuel efficiency. Mayo and Mathis (1988) include the CAFE standard for 
each year. 
The basic equation for vehicle miles traveled (VMT) is a function offuel efficiency, price 
ofgasoline, income, and a stock variable. Alternatively, through the identity CPM = price j ,
. jmpg 
cost per mile (CPM) replaces the variables for price and fuel efficiency. The stock variable can be 
represented by the number of drivers, the number of vehicles in use, population, or the number of 
registered vehicles. The number of drivers is the variable most often used, followed in frequency 
-by vehicles in use. Greene (1992) estimated equations for vehicle miles traveled testing the use of 
.. 
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vehicle stock versus licensed drivers and found that the results did not change with the choice of 
stock variable. 
Table 1.	 Variables used in previous studies in estimations for fuel efficiency and 
vehicle miles traveled 
MPGModels 
Espey (1996) Price, Income, Time, Tax Index, MPG-1 
Nivola and Crandall (1995) Price, CAFE, Price of steel 
Gately (1990) Price, Max Price, Time, MPG.1 
Mayo and Mathis (1988) Price, Income, Speed, Cars, CAFE 
Blair, et at. (1984) Price, Income 
Wheaton (1982) Price, Income, Tax, Urbanization 
VMTModels 
Nivola and Crandall (1995) Price, Income, Drivers, MPG 
Greene (1992) Cost/Mile, Income, Drivers, VMT.1 
Gately (1990) Cost/Mile, Income, Drivers 
Mayo and Mathis (1988) Cost/Mile, Income, Population, Cars, VMT.1 
Blair, et al. (1984) Cost/Mile, Income, Population 
Wheaton (1982) Price, Income, MPG, Cars, Area 
Table 2 presents the elasticities calculated in prior work and the ranges of elasticities 
surveyed by Dahl (1986). However, since each model uses different parameters, the 
interpretation of elasticities must be done with caution. For studies that used lagged dependent 
variables in MPG and VMT, both short-run and long-run elasticities are reported. For studies 
that did not use this dynamic framework, the direct elasticity estimate is reported. Nivola and 
Crandall (1995) estimated separate equations for passenger cars and light trucks and found 
differing elasticities. For the most part, the elasticity estimates in the individual papers concur 
-

with the survey by Dahl (1986). 
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Table 2. Elasticity estimates from previous studies 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Mayo and Nivola and 
Greene Gately Wheaton Dahl Crandall 
(1992) 
Mathis 
(1990) (1982) (1988) (1986) (1995) 
SR .08 .17 [.06,.21] .21 PC .39
.0023 .32,.33
'llMPG,P LT .59
21 .90 .57 [.32,.69] LR 
SR -.07 [-.03,-.08] 
.01 -.21,-.20
'llMPG,I 
-.21LR 
SR -.32 [-.10,-.50] PC -.10 
-.50,-.54
'llVMf,P LT -.10 
-.55 [0,-1.8] LR 
.05 .25 .26 [.06,.98] SR PC .42 
.92,.52 .54,.46
'llVMf,I LT .52
.12 .30 .60 [.54,4.9] LR 
SR PC .012 
.06,.10 .27 [.06,.50] 
'llVMf,MPG LT .043LR
 
SR
 -.10,-.12 -.22 
-.07,-.09
'llVMf,CPM 
-.26-.25,-.33LR 
NOTES: 
This table reports the price (P) and income (I) elasticities of demand for fuel efficiency (MPG) 
and vehicle miles traveled (VMT), as well as the cost per mile (CPM) elasticity for vehicle miles 
traveled. 
The CPM elasticity should be equal to the price elasticity minus the MPG elasticity (i.e. 
7'JVMT.CPM ::: 7'JVMT.P - 7'JVMT.MPG)· 
Numbers reported in the middle of the rows come from models without a lagged dependent
 
variable, implying that the elasticity is a one period, full adjustment.
 
From the Dahl (1986) article, average elasticities are reported, followed by ranges in brackets.
 
In the Nivola and Crandall (1995) book, they calculated separate elasticities for passenger cars
 
(PC) and light trucks (LT).
 
Other studies have taken a more general approach to estimating fuel demand and often 
arrive at very different results. Goldberg (1996) examined the effect of CAFE, gasoline taxes, and 
• 
gas guzzler taxes on product mix, prices, and fuel consumption by combining a demand side 
model with an oligopolistic supply model. Goldberg found that a stronger gas guzzler tax was the 
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best policy, followed by stricter CAFE standards, and finally increasing gasoline taxes. She 
estimated that the gasoline tax would have had to be increased by 780% of its current value to 
achieve fuel consumption reductions equivalent to those achieved by CAFE. This result followed 
from her econometric results which find mileage demand wholly unresponsive to changes in 
operating costs. 
THE MODEL 
Using meta analysis for parameterization, this paper projects fuel efficiency, total vehicle 
miles traveled, fuel consumption, and CO2 emissions in the light-duty vehicle sector. Using data 
from 1982-1995, equations for fuel efficiency and vehicle miles traveled are calibrated, and 
applied to Kyoto goals for 2010. This is done separately for passenger cars and light trucks. 
Through the identity Qf =VMT/ MPG we calculate fuel consumption and then CO2 emissions.2 
Once we have established a base case with no new policies (i.e., CAFE standards remain at 27.5 
for passenger cars and 20.7 for light trucks, and gasoline taxes remain at their current level), we 
then introduce higher CAFE standards and increasing gasoline taxes individually to force fuel 
consumption in 2010 to equal 93% of actual 1990 levels. Finally, we look at what levels of these 
policies would be necessary when used in combination to meet Kyoto objectives. 
As seen from the previous studies, fuel efficiency is typically estimated as a function of the 
price ofgasoline, income, and time. Since our aim is to meet Kyoto Protocol objectives using 
gasoline taxes and CAFE standards, we also include a variable for CAFE and add an additional 
-

2 One million gallons of gasoline emits 2424.88 metric tons of C02 (EIA, 1997b, P 100). 
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gasoline tax variable, included within the retail price variable. Equation (1) is the function used to 
predict fuel efficiency. 
where i =passenger cars and light trucks and t = 1982-2010; MPG is the average fuel economy 
for all passenger cars and light trucks on the road; P+ tax is the pre-tax price ofgasoline plus 
additional taxes; GDP is real per capita income; CAFE is the standard in year t; and Time is a 
trend capturing technological change.3 We have included the lag offuel efficiency to capture 
long. and short-run changes in fuel efficiency. 
Our equation for vehicle miles traveled takes the form ofEquation (2). 
InVJ\1T;,t =B+A In VJ\1T;,t-l + f3t In(P+tax);,t + P21nGD~,t + A InDRIV;,t + P41nMPG;,t (2) 
VMTis total vehicle miles traveled by passenger cars and light trucks (in millions); DR/Vis the 
number of drivers; and the rest of the variables are as defined above. Again we have included the 
lag ofthe dependent variable to capture long-run changes in vehicle miles of travel. For the base 
case we have used the number of drivers as the stock variable. Alternatively, as discussed in the 
previous section, vehicles in use (VER) could be adopted as the stock variable. We make this 
substitution in subsequent models. 
From these two equations, we first forecast MPG to the year 2010, then use this estimate 
to forecast VMT to 2010. From these estimates, we calculate total fuel consumption through the 
• 
3 See Appendix A for information on data sources. 
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identitylnQf =InWI4T-lnMPG. By substituting in the equations for MPG and VMT, fuel 
consumption can be represented as in Equation (3): 
InQf =[B+A(P4 -1)]+Po InWJF_1 +aO(P4 -1) In MPG_1+[A +a1(P4 -1)]ln(P+kR) (3)
+[A +a2 (P4 -1)]lnGDP+A InDRlV +a3(P4 -1) InCAFE+a4(P4 -1)Time 
where i and t are implicit and Qf is million gallons ofgasoline. From this equation, the price and 
income elasticities are easily calculated for fuel consumption. The indirect price elasticity for fuel 
consumption is represented by TJQ.P = f3.. + at (P4 -1), a function of the price elasticities for fuel 
efficiency (CXI), vehicle miles traveled (~l), and the elasticity offuel efficiency for vehicle miles 
traveled (~4). Similarly, the indirect income elasticity for fuel consumption is 
TJQ.GDP = pz + a Z(p4 -1), a function of the income elasticities for fuel efficiency (CX2), vehicle miles 
traveled (~2), and the elasticity offuel efficiency for vehicle miles traveled (~4). Using the 
parameters for the MPG and VMT equations, the elasticities for fuel consumption can be 
calculated and compared to elasticities for fuel demand reported by Dahl and Sterner (1991). 
MODEL 1: BASE CASE SCENARIO 
Selection ofParameters 
Our objective in the first model is to select elasticities that fall in the range of those 
reported in Table 2, such that our projections match forecasts for fuel consumption and vehicle 
miles traveled that have been estimated by other sources. 
­
EIA (1997a) projects future energy use to the year 2020. For the transportation sector, 
they predict a VMT annual growth rate of 1.5% and a 1.3% increase menergy use by light-duty 
11
 
vehicles (EIA, 1997a, pIlI). Greene's (1990b) base case scenario shows both fuel consumption 
and vehicle miles traveled increasing at 1.5% annually from 1990-2015. 
Since the EIA (1997a) model uses a variable for drivers in their calculations, we calibrated 
our base case model using Equations (1) and (2) with the coefficients listed in Table 3. These 
values were chosen to be consistent with the elasticities reported in Tables 2 and 3 and all our 
parameter values fall within the middle of reported ranges. For example, the short-run average 
price elasticity for fuel efficiency reported by Dahl (1986) is 0.17. This corresponds to our value 
for a.. Using the coefficient for MPG_l, the long-run price elasticity for fuel efficiency is 
a 
17J:;,G P = ( .) , which in our base case equals 0.51. Similarly, we use a short-run income 
, 1-ao 
elasticity of -0.07, resulting in a long-run income elasticity of -0.21, identical to that reported. 
Our choice of coefficient for CAFE was derived by hypothesizing that the effect of CAFE 
on fuel efficiency was an 85% long-run adjustment. This represents the difference between the 
Environmental Protection Agency's unadjusted and real-world adjusted fuel efficiency estimates 
for vehicles. The CAFE standard applies to the fuel efficiency numbers that are posted on new 
vehicles for sale. These values are calculated by the EPA from tests run on vehicles in ideal 
driving conditions. Actual fuel efficiencies typically reach 85% of ideal fuel efficiencies.4 
Therefore, since CAFE standards apply to new cars only, if it would take eight to fifteen years for 
all cars on the road to reach the 27.5 mpg standard, and even then the fuel efficiency of cars 
would only be 23 mpg. Hence, our short-run elasticity for CAFE is 0.28, resulting in a long-run 
elasticity of 0.84. 
-

4 The EPA adjusts downward their test results to account for the difference between controlled
 
laboratory conditions and actual driving on the road. The EPA lowers the city estimate by 10% and the
 
highway estimate by 22% from the laboratory test results (EPA, 1997).
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Table 3. Coefficients used in Base Case Fuel Consumption Model 
MPG Equation 
Our Estimates Other Estimates 
(from Table 2) 
MPG_1 a.o 0.667 
Price-SR 0.1 0.17 .17 [.06,.21] 
Price-LR l6(1- ao) .51 .57 [.32,.69] 
GDP-SR 0.2 -0.07 -.07 [-.03,-.08] 
GDP-LR Ji(1- ao) -.21 -.21 
CAFE 0.3 0.28 
Time 0.4 0.001 
VMT Equation 
VMT_1 Po .53 
Price PI -.32 -.32 [-.10,-.50] 
Price-LR %-Po) -.68 -.55 [0,-1.8] 
GDP P2 .26 .26 [.06,.98] 
GDP-LR %(1- Po) .55 .60 [.54,4.9] 
Driv P3 .5 [.48,.91] 
MPG P4 .1 .27 [.06,.50] 
QrEquation 
Price A. + a l (P4 - 1) -.47 -.41 [-.10,-.75] 
GDP A +a2 (P4 -1) .32 .41 [.32,.47] -

13 
The coefficients used in the VMT equation have similar representations. We use a short­
run price elasticity of -0.32, which results in a long-run elasticity of -0.68. The short-run income 
elasticity of 0.26, calculates into a long-run elasticity of 0.55. These numbers correspond to 
elasticities reported in Table 2. 
Base Case Results 
Overall, the results for this base case scenario are similar to other forecasts. In our model, 
vehicle miles traveled increases on average 1.6% annually and fuel consumption increases 1.4% 
annually on average. This is consistent with predictions by EIA (1997a) and Greene (1990b). 
Passenger cars achieve a fuel efficiency of23 mpg by 2010 and light trucks on the road get on 
average 14 mpg. 
However, using the number of drivers rather than vehicles in use may underestimate fuel 
consumption by the light truck sector. In this first model, we let the number ofdrivers increase by 
1% annually for both cars and light trucks, whereas cars in use have been increasing at less than 
1% in the 1990s, while light trucks in use are increasing at 2-3%. This problem is reflected in the 
estimates for average vehicle miles traveled by individual vehicles. In 1995, both passenger cars 
and light trucks, on average, drove approximately 11,000 miles per year. Under the base case 
scenario, the average annual miles for passenger cars increases to 14,800 miles while the light 
truck average decreases to 9,900 miles per year. While this mileage differential is possible, we 
also utilize a "vehicles in use" model which has different characteristics. 
MODEL 2: VEHICLE MODEL VERSUS DRIVER MODEL 
..
 
Using the same parameters as in the base case scenario, we substitute vehicles in use for 
number of drivers in the VMT equation. Unlike gasoline prices, income, and population, 
14 
forecasts ofvehicles in use are not widely available. Furthennore, forecasts for cars and light 
trucks separately are not found in the literature. We developed a relationship to forecast vehicles 
in use with equations capturing both the shift between consumption of passenger cars and light 
trucks, and the overall demand for vehicles as functions of the price ofgasoline (including taxes) 
and income (see Appendix A for estimation results).s These equations capture the shift toward 
light trucks with low gasoline prices (i.e. low taxes) and high incomes, and project a shift away 
from light trucks with higher gasoline taxes. 
Using this model, the growth in total vehicle miles traveled remains the same at 1.6%, but 
the growth in fuel consumption is much higher (1.9% instead of 1.4%). This is consistent with 
estimates by the EPA when taking into consideration the growth in the light truck market. As 
well, the projected average annual vehicle miles traveled by cars and trucks is more representative 
ofcurrent growth rates, both reaching 13,000 miles traveled annually by 2010. Figure 3 shows 
the increase in fuel consumption comparing the two cases with number of drivers and vehicles in 
use. The increase in fuel consumption is more rapid with the vehicle model, exceeding the driver 
model by 9% in 2010. Fuel consumption predictions with the vehicle model also better capture 
recent increased demand for light trucks. 
INTRODUCTION OF POLICIES TO MEET KYOTO OBJECTIVE 
Now that a base case has been established for both models, policies are introduced to 
force fuel consumption and CO2 emissions to reach 93% of 1990 levels by 2010. Strieter CAFE 
standards and increased gasoline taxes are initially introduced individually to detennine what 
• 
levels of each are necessary to reach Kyoto objectives. All policies are introduced in 1999 and a 
5 We thank Timothy Mount for his suggestion of this estimating method. 
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-certain level is added each year to 2010.6 For example, in the driver model, using only the CAFE 
standard, 2 mpg need to be added each year from 1999 to 2010 to reach our objective. This 
increases the new passenger car CAFE standard from 27.5 mpg in 1998 to 52 mpg in 2010 and 
the light truck standard increases to 45 mpg by 2010. Using only a gasoline tax, 5.4¢/gallon need 
to be added each year to adequately decrease fuel consumption. This means that the price of 
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Figure 3: Fuel Consumption Scenarios 
6 We chose to start the policies in 1999 since the CAFE standard for 1998 has already been announced. 
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gasoline increases from $1. 16/gallon in 1998 to $1.91/gallon in 2010 (in 1996$). Tables 4a and 
4b present the CAFE and gasoline tax increases necessary for the driver and vehicle models and 
the resulting increase in 2010. As expected, the levels needed under the vehicle model are 
significantly greater, 15% higher than with the driver model. 
Once the increases are estimated individually, we allow both CAFE and gasoline taxes to 
adjust and estimate the necessary levels when the policies are used jointly. It is interesting to note 
that when the policies are used jointly, less than 50% of each is necessary to achieve our goal. In 
the vehicle model, only 43% of initially established CAFE and gasoline taxes would be necessary 
to meet our objective. Figure 4 presents the locus of points ofvarying percentages that reduce 
fuel consumption and CO2 emissions to 93% of 1990 levels. From this diagram, levels of each 
policy can be chosen that will fulfill Kyoto obligations. If, for example, policy makers favored 
using both policies equally, only 43% of the initial levels of each is needed (this is represented by 
the solid lines in Figure 4). However, ifpolicy makers feel that their constituents feel more 
favorably towards the CAFE standard, rather than gasoline taxes, a higher rate of CAFE standard 
could be used with a slightly lower tax (a 58% CAFE and a 29% tax represent a 2 to 1 preference 
for CAFE standards - see dashed lines in Figure 4). 
The shape of this isoquant depends mainly on the price elasticities in each equation (al and 
PI), the CAFE elasticity (a3), and the fuel efficiency elasticity of vehicle miles traveled (P4). With 
some algebraic manipulation, the relationship between the tax rate and the CAFE standard is 
represented by Equation (4). 
-
(4)
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Table 4a. Policies Needed to Meet Kyoto Objectives: Increases per Year 
Driver Model Vehicle Model 
Only CAFE 
Only Gas Tax 
Equal Preference 
CAFE 
Preferred 
Tax 
Preferred 
2.03 mpg 2.35 mpg 
5.4 ¢/gallon 6.1 ¢/gallon 
0.88 mpg (44%) 1.00 mpg (43%) 
2.4 ¢/gallon (44%) 2.6 ¢/gallon (43%) 
1.20 mpg (59%) 1.36 mpg (58%) 
1.6 ¢/gallon (29%) 1.8 ¢/gallon (29%) 
0.60 mpg (29%) 0.68 mpg (29%) 
3.2 ¢/gallon (59%) 3.5 ¢/gallon (58%) 
NOTE: All policies begin in 1999 and continue through 2010. The increases per year 
accumulate to 2010, implying that the CAFE standard in 2010 in the only CAFE 
policy for the driver model would be 52 mpg for passenger cars (starting at 27.5 
mpg in 1998 and increasing by 2.03 mpg per year for 12 years) and 45 mpg for light 
trucks (see Table 4b). 
Table 4b. Fuel Efficiency and Gasoline Tax Rates in 2010 with Policy 
Driver Model Vehicle Model 
PC LT Tax PC LT Tax 
(mpg) (mpg) (¢/gal) (mpg) (mpg) (¢/gal) 
Only CAFE 
Only Tax 
Equal 
1998 
2010 
2010 
2010 
27.5 
52 
38 
20.7 
45 
31 
0 
65¢ 
29¢ 
27.5 
56 
40 
20.7 
49 
33 
0 
73¢ 
31¢ 
-
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where C is a constant. More specifically, in 2010, Equation (4) can be rewritten as (4'). 
where $1.26/gallon is the predicted price ofgasoline in 2010, the tax and CAFE standard are 
multiplied by the number of years that the policies are in place, and 27.5 mpg and 20.7 mpg are 
the original CAFE standards for passenger cars and light trucks, respectively. The coefficient on 
CAFE will always be negative as long as ~4<1, and the degree of curvature of the isoquant will 
vary depending on the magnitudes of the other elasticities, but remain convex. 
160% 
>( 
~ 
.5 
cu 
Cl 
C 
III 
.c 
u 
i 
~ 
cu 
Q, 
-20·" 
percent change in CAFE 
Figure 4. CAFEffax Isoquant 
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CO2 EMISSIONS 
As mentioned previously, the estimate for CO2 emissions (in metric tons) can be directly 
derived from our estimates of fuel consumption through the identity CO2 =2424.88Qf' where 
2424.88 metric tons carbon per million gallons ofgasoline are emitted. Figures 5a and 5b present 
CO2 emissions from the base case results for the vehicle and driver models. These figures are 
separated into emissions from light trucks and passenger cars. In the driver model (Figure 5b), 
CO2 emissions from light trucks never reaches the level of passenger cars. However, this is 
inconsistent with EPA predictions. The EPA has estimated that CO2 emissions from light trucks 
will surpass that of passenger cars before the year 2000 (Bradsher, 1997). The vehicle model is a 
better predictor of this result. Figure 5a shows that around 2005, CO2 emissions from light trucks 
will be equal to passenger car emissions at 180 million metric tons and they exceed passenger car 
emissions by 23% in 2010. From the vehicle model, emissions from light trucks and passenger 
cars are predicted to be 230 and 185 million metric tons, respectively by 2010. The EPA predicts 
levels of250 and 150 million metric tons in 2010 for light trucks and passenger cars, respectively 
(Bradsher, 1997). 
DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL 
While a CAFE standard that increased by 2 mpg per year may be technologically feasible, 
it may not be implemented. Producers may choose to pay the fines and continue selling vehicles 
with lesser fuel efficiencies. This would mean that our model underestimates fuel consumption 
and emissions. On the other hand, ifmanufacturers strive to achieve these higher fuel economy 
­
standards, prices of vehicles could rise. With higher vehicle prices, consumers would purchase 
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fewer vehicles, implying that our model overestimates fuel consumption and emissions. This 
model could be strengthened by deriving demand for vehicles as a function of the distribution of 
vehicle prices, which is itself a function of the CAFE standard. In general, raising CAFE a) may 
lower average price because the average vehicle is lighter in weight or b) increase the average 
price ifmore costly materials are used to attain lighter vehicles. Almost certainly, CAFE leads 
producers to lower small car prices and increase large car prices. 
The final result of our model is that there is a range of policy options available that would 
allow the US to reduce its demand for gasoline. We have discussed the choice in a political 
economy framework. While this may be appropriate for implementation ofpolicies, it is certainly 
not the only choice variable. Ideally, the optimal combination ofpolicies should be the one that 
maximizes social welfare. This means that the policies should be equitable (i.e. the benefits and 
costs are shared by all) and efficient. Several papers have addressed the issue of the costs and 
benefits of increased CAFE standards and gasoline taxes (see Crandall, 1992 and Crandall, et al., 
1986). 
Table 5 presents some of the economic and environmental consequences of each policy. 
Both CAFE and gasoline taxes reduce consumer surplus through increased prices and reduce fuel 
consumption and emissions. However, CAFE may have additional costs in the form ofmarket 
distortions. With an increasing demand for larger vehicles (attributable to low gasoline prices and 
aggressive advertising by US car producers), manufacturers may find they have to sell an 
increased number of smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles to counterbalance their increased sales of 
larger, less fuel efficient vehicles. This could create a distribution ofvehicles on the road that 
­
leads to more traffic fatalities. Ultimately, the optimal policy choice should be one that 
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monetarizes the costs and benefits listed in Table 5 and chooses the best combination of CAFE 
and gasoline taxes. 
Table 5. Costs and Benefits of CAFE Standards and Gasoline Taxes 
CAFE 
•	 increased vehicle prices 
•	 more older cars on the road 
•	 market distortions (increased number Costs 
ofbig vehicles supplemented by an 
increased number of smaller cars) 
• increased vehicle miles traveled 
• decreased fuel consumption 
• decreased emissions Benefits 
•	 lower fuel economy car prices could 
subsidize higher fuel economy car 
prices (progressive) 
CONCLUSIONS 
Gas Tax 
•	 increased gasoline prices 
•	 politically unpopular 
•	 possibly taxing poor more than rich 
(regressive) 
•	 decreased fuel consumption 
•	 decreased emissions 
•	 increased government revenue 
•	 increased demand for fuel efficient 
cars 
This paper has shown one way that the US could demonstrate its sincerity in achieving 
Kyoto Protocol objectives. An implementation of increased CAFE standards and higher gasoline 
taxes would significantly reduce CO2 emissions in the transportation sector. The US initiated the 
CAFE standards twenty years ago, but has maintained the same standard for passenger cars for 
the last ten years and has only increased the standard for trucks by 0.2 mpg in that same time. 
The policy is in place, yet it requires some increase to effectively reduce fuel consumption. 
Some may argue that since the Kyoto Protocol applies to overall CO2 and greenhouse gas 
emissions, reductions can be made in other sectors. However, ultimately the transportation sector 
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would have to change gasoline use levels to meet Kyoto goals. In Britain, for example, the fastest 
growing source of CO2 emissions is transportation and it will account for all of the projected 
increase in CO2 emissions between 1970 and 2020 and of this, two-thirds is by private vehicles 
(The Economist, 1998). 
Additionally, any reductions in fuel consumption to curb CO2 emissions will have co­
benefits for local air pollution problems. Since 1970, the US has been very successful in reducing 
vehicle emissions of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and lead. However, in 
those same years, the number of miles driven has more than doubled, offsetting some of the 
overall emissions reductions (EPA, 1994). While technologies are still being developed to offset 
more of these pollutants, reductions in fuel consumption will have an immediate effect in 
improving local air quality. 
Using CAFE standards exclusively will not give consumers sufficient economic incentive 
to use less fuel. A combination of increased CAFE standards and higher gasoline taxes will help 
the US to meet Kyoto Protocol objectives and improve air quality everywhere. 
•
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APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES 
Vehicle Miles of Travel (VMT): 
American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), Motor Vehicle Facts 
& Figures, various years. For example, AAMA, 1997, reports VMT in the section 
"Annual Motor Vehicle Miles ofTravel and Fuel Consumption" (AAMA, 1997, P 
64). The data were collected from 1982-1995 and then forecast to 2010 from 
models in this paper. 
Fuel Consumption (Qr): 
American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), Motor Vehicle Facts 
&Figures, various years. For example, AAMA, 1997, reports Qf in the section 
"Annual Motor Vehicle Miles ofTravel and Fuel Consumption" (AAMA, 1997, P 
64). The data were collected from 1982-1995 and then forecast to 2010 from 
models in this paper. 
Fuel Efficiency (MPG): 
Using the data collected for VMT and Qf, MPG was calculated for 1992-1995 and 
then forecast to 2010 from models in this paper. 
Number of Drivers (DRIV): 
American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), Motor Vehicle Facts 
&Figures, various years. For example, AAMA, 1997, reports DRIV in the 
section "Licensed Drivers" (AAMA, 1997, P 56). The data were collected from 
1982-1995 and then increased by 1% pa to 2010. 
Price of Gasoline (price): 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy Review, May 1998. 
The price data for 1982-1997 come from the series for All Types from Table 9.4 
Motor Gasoline Retail Prices, U.S. City Average (EIA, 1998, P 114 - deflated to 
1996 ¢/gallon by CPI-U). These prices include federal and state taxes. The data 
for 1998-2010 are from Table 12. Petroleum Product Prices. They are the sales 
weighted-average price for all grades, including predicted federal and state taxes, 
but excluding county and local taxes. 
Gasoline Taxes (tax): 
American Petroleum Institute (API), How Much We Payfor Gasoline, 1997 
Annual Review, Policy Analysis and Strategic Planning Department, April 1998. 
Average Per Gallon Motor Fuel Taxes are reported in Table 3B (API, 1998, P 9) 
in 1997 ¢/gallon and then are readjusted to 1996 ¢/gallon using the CPI-U. These 
include federal and weighted average U.S. state taxes, but excludes local taxes. 
-

Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE): 
American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), Motor Vehicle Facts 
&Figures, various years. For example, AAMA, 1997, reports CAFE Standards in 
27 
the sections "New Carrrruck Corporate Average Fuel Economy" (AAMA, 1997, 
P 80-81). The data were collected from 1982-1995 and then varied to meet Kyoto 
Protocol objectives. 
Per Capita Income (GDP): 
Economic Report ofthe President, 1997. The 1982-1995 GOP data come from 
the real GOP series in 1992$. This was then adjusted to 1996$ using the CPI-U 
and divided by the population estimates also given in the Economic Report ofthe 
President, 1997. GOP is then forecast to increase by 1.3% from 1996-2000 and 
by 1.5% from 2001-2010. 
Vehicle in Use (VEH): 
AAMA, various years. The 1982-1995 data for vehicles in use comes from the 
AAMA'sMotor Vehicle Facts & Figures. This data was then forecast using 
equations to capture the shift between passenger cars and light trucks and total 
demand for vehicles with changing gasoline prices and incomes. We estimated the 
following equations: 
SHARE ) ( SHARE )In( =A + Po In . + A In(P + tax);.1 + P2 In GDP;" + &;,1 (lA)1- SHARE ;,1 1- SHARE i,l-l 
In VEH; I =A + aoInVEll; I-I + aIIn(P + tax); 1+ a 2In GDP; I + v; I (2A). . . .,
where i=passenger cars and light trucks, t=1978-1995, SHARE is the percentage of 
passenger cars in use, P + tax is the average retail price ofgasoline (all types) plus federal 
and state gasoline taxes, GOP is per capita income, and VER is the number ofvehicles in 
use. In equation (IA), we use a logit transformation of SHARE and estimate both using 
OLS. The estimated coefficients for equations (lA) and (2A) are listed in Table lA. 
Table lA. Estimated Coefficients for Vehicle in Use Forecast 
I ( SHARE ) InVER 
n I-SHARE 
I ( SHARE ) 
n I-SHARE -I 
In VEH. I
 
In (price + tax)
 
0.723 
(0.237) 
0.672 
(0.089) 
-0.087 -0.028 
(0.363) (0.024) 
-0.796 0.249 
(1.052) (0.113) 
• 
In GOP 
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